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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BYRON R-. GRIFFITHS, 
Plaintiff a.nd R·espondenl, 
-vs.-
Case No. 8154 
SHIRLEY GRIFFITHS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF ·OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this case, "\Ve have the novel proposition of the 
cart before the horse. 'The post-marital conduct of the 
parties was but a eon'tinuation of the situation as it had 
developed and existed fron1 some five or ·six years off 
and on association between the parties before the mar-
riage. The parties had kept company during that period 
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of time and had beco1ne successiYely n1ore ineo1npatible 
so that a normal marriage was co1npletely negated and 
never developed. Then, on the eve of the plaintiff's in-
duction into World War II, the plaintiff, from a kind, 
hun1ane and generous motive, voluntarily married the 
defendant to give her the status of a wife solely to give 
her financial allotment support and soldier's death bene-
fit because he knew he migh!t not return, (R. 15-16) all 
of which he was not required to do. Thereafter, and con-
sistent with the previ·ous history of the parties, it is 
obvious that they both recognized that this was a n1ar-
ria.ge in name only. 
Fro1n the date of plaintiff's induction the day follo\v-
ing the marriage on Decen1ber 6, 1943, until his departure 
for overseas from Camp Beal in N ove1nber, 1944, the 
plaintiff was stationed in the states (R. 16) and his 
\Vife could have accon1panied hi1n and lived with hun 
during that year, as norn1ally she 'vould have done. But 
nowhere in the record does she say she did that, 
atten1pted it, or had any desire to live 'vith him. lie 
had a 'vife in name only. ( R. 18) Her letters were ordi-
nary 1na tter of fact letters. ( R. 17) She can1e to see hi1n 
for about four da.ys before his departure overs~as. (R. 
16), not a particularly impressive gesture even under 
the circun1stances. Then, consistent with the plaintiff's 
version, he wrote her for a divorce when he reached 
IIa,vaii and knew definitely he was returning fro1n his 
ar1ny ·service alive and ·the basis a.nd reason for this 
Inarriage no longer existed (R. 18). The defendant dr-
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n1urred, and during the plaintiff's 90 day mustering out 
period, the parties tried it again (R. 20). 
During this period, the plaintiff proved act~s of men-
tal cruelty by defendant sufficient to establish grounds 
for the· divorce the court granted him. Defendant claimed 
that her conduct was justified because it was occasioned 
by plaintiff's drinking and the type of friends he asso-
ciated with, but those were the same friends plaintiff 
had before the marriage, (R. 58 and 79) and these friends 
objectionable to defendant did not justify her conduct in 
being unjustly suspicious, searching plaintiff's pockets 
and embarrassing him "\vith calls to his friends, precipi-
tating arguments by bringing up the past ( R. 21-22-23-24) 
accusing him of giving her syphilis (R·. 5) (when she 
\Vas just as much on the loose before the marriage when 
they contracted syphili~s, as he was, and he was cured 
\vithin a year and she still has it, indicating hers Inight 
have had-an earlier start) etc. 
I-Ier eonduct was such as to drive him back to the 
army in June, 1946 ( R. 24, 25, 46). 
For a year thereafter, defendant failed to join plain-
tiff and live "\Vi'th him as a wife (R. 25). There is son1e 
correspondence in "\vhich he stated rents were high where 
he was stationed, but when defendant made up her mind 
to join him in Camp· Lee, she did ( R .. 25). There, four 
years after this mock marriage, and after plaintiff's 
grounds of cruelty had accrued, defPndant finds the 
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plaintiff in the company of another woman (R. 46)-her 
firs't and only credible complaint of cruelty. It is un-
contested that the plaintiff shipped this other girl out of 
town forthwith (R. 48) the defendant condoned this inci-
dent (R. 25, 46) and the parties commenced living to-
~ether as husband and wife. ~rhe situation thereafter, 
as vie"\ved by the court acting within its province, shows 
that the defendant revived her former conduct (R. 2G, 
·47) and, as the plaintiff testified, the situation was worse 
than ever, there was constant quarreling and tension 
at all tin1es and the parties spoke civilly only three or 
four days out of a n1onth (R. 26), and the parties sepa-
rated and have lived separate and apart since the fall 
of 194 7. There is nothing in the record to indicate that 
the plain tiff ever 'Since said tin1e six years ago kept com-
pany with this woman (R. 57) or any other 'voman. 
The plaintiff testified that he \Vas evacuated from 
con1bat duty in l(orea in 1951 and hospitalized six weeks 
for a disease called lichen planis, a disorder induced by 
nervousness and worry 'vhich causes a breaking out of 
the skin and terrific itching all over the body (R. 28). 
lie testified that worry CJver his unwholeso1ne marital 
relationship was definitely one of the causes of this 
nervous disorder (R. 29) "wor~ying 1ne very 1nueh, up-
setting me very much, and that my physical and mental 
condition would improve if the relationship 'vere se-
vered." ( R-. 29). Plain tiff was still ·suffering from this 
disorder t\vo and a half years later at the ti1ne of trial 
in J'une, 1953 (I~. 29). lie further testified that he 'vould 
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not and did not want to live with Mrs. Griffiths as her 
husband, that her conduct since the marriage had caused 
him great mental ·distress and suffering and had defi-
ni'tely caused his health to suffer (R. 33). 
On this reeord, the Court granted a divorce to the 
plaintiff 'vho sought it. Appellant demurs to this, feeling 
that because of his "brutality" in once having a woman 
four years after this meaningless marriage was con-
ceived, he should be denied a divorce and deprived of his 
right to find happiness during his remaining life as a 
penalty for having voluntarily married this defendant 
in a hu1nane and merciful gesture 'vhere she alone stood 
to reap the benefit. 
STATE~fENT OF POINTS OF APPELLANT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS AGAINST THE 
LAW. 
II. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
A FINDING IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
CONTRA ARGU1.fENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS AGAINST THE 
LAW. 
Appellant complains that the trial court's decision 
was ao-ainst the law because the basis of the Court's de-o 
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cision, according to appellant's theory, \Va.s t11a.t the hus-
band proved minor acts of cruelty and had no desire for 
_this marriage to continue, and the Court granted a di-
vorce notwithstanding that the wife had ground and did 
not desire a divorce. Even accepting appellant's theor~T' 
how does the decision run contrary to the law~ If the 
Court finds that there is evidence to support and prove 
plaintiff's cause of action, the plaintiff is entitled to the 
relief he seeks, without regard to the \vishes of the other 
party. As for plaintiff proving "minor" acts ·of cruelty, 
certainly the language of the C·ourt cannot be stronger 
than as exp~ressed in its Findings of Fact concerning the 
acts of cruelty by defendant toward plaintiff. Findings 
No. 7 and 8 enumerating the specific acts of defendant's 
cruelty eonstitute two full pages of the record and contain 
just ~bout every act that a nagging, jealous, suspicious, 
shre~ish wife could be guilty of. And then appellant 
has the temerity to question the trial court's judg1nent 
by saying such decision is shocking to one's sense of 
good conscience, justice and decency because this spouse 
\Vas "so guilty" and he·ca.use the \vife didn't \Vant a di-
' /· 
vorce. 
·Of course she didn't \Vant a divorce·. IIer only conl-
plaint against hin1 throughout ten years was_ an isolated 
instance of alleged adultery seven years ago, \vhereas he 
supported and n1aintained her during all of this rnarriage 
in exchange for living \vith her approxilnately four 
1nonths during the ten years. On the other hand, she has 
repaid him by 1na.king his life a hell on ea1ih \vhen they 
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"\vere together, driving him back into the army to escape 
her (R .. 24, Finding 7) and breaking his health to the 
point of his suffering a serious disorder for the last three 
years of this marriage. Is a decision severing such an un-
fair and unhealthy relationship "shocking to good con-
science, justice and decency"~ And we will not unduly 
burden this C·ourt with authorities that the trial judge 
is the weigher of the evidence. There is ample evidence 
in the stark record to support plaintiff's case, and from 
the Court's Findings and judgment it is apparent that 
he found the plaintiff credible and decided accordingly 
that the plaintiff had proved his cause of action and was 
entitled to a divorce. 
Appellant cites Alldredge v. Alldredge, 229 P. 2d 
681, Cordner v. Cordn.er, 61 P. 2d 601, and Doe v. Doe, 
158 P. 781, that acts and conduct of a husband to a 
wife may constitute cruelty, but before a decree is grant-
ed to a husband on similar grounds, "it ought to be some-
\vhat of an aggravated case." (Doe v. Doe). We cite the 
record and the C·ourt's Findings to support that this 
case is something even n1ore than "somewhat of an ag-
gravated case." 
Then appellant recites that where both parties are 
guilty of grounds, this Court has recognized the 
doctrine of comparative rectitude and grants a divorce to 
the party least at fault (terming herself the party least 
at fault), recognizing that the union should be severed. 
8hould rc lief then be denied under identical circun1-
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stances, just because the party "least at fault" desires to 
hang on 
1
to the hulk of a wrecked marriage for selfish 
reasons inconsistent with the best interest of both parties. 
Should one wronged party be left shackled in bondage 
because of the selfish desires of the wrongdoer~ Appel-
lant apparently thinks so, citing H endriclcs v. Hendricks, 
257 P. 2d 366, as support that whatever the basis of the 
doctrine of comparative rectitude, the simple equitable 
rule of "clean hands" should bar Byron Griffith's action 
for divorce here. 
In the II endricks case, both parties claimed a divorce 
and the court said surely the parties should be set apart 
and the divorce granted to the one least at fault-the 
doctrine of 'Comparative rectitude. Certainly, that is 
logical and you \vould not expect the court to grant the 
divorce to the one most at fault where both sought a 
divorce. Defendant further says that the Hendricks 
case holds that where either spouse is accused of the con1-
n1ission of a felony, adultery, or any other heinous of-
fense, the doctrine of comparative rectitude \vill not 
apply. A close reading of this case \vill disclose that that 
is not \vhat .the court says. It says: 
"There are undoubtedly so1ne circumstances, 
~such as JnuJu,al conviction of a felony, adultery, or 
other serious offenses \vhich Inay justify a court of 
equity in refusing to grant relief. Whether this 
he recrimination or the "clean hands" doctrine is 
of no i1nportanc.e here. To affirnz. that a guilty 
szJouse is nfver entitled to a di.vorce is a positioll 
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difficult to apply to the facts of life. It is sel-
dorn, perhaps never, that any wholly innocent 
party seeks a divorce against one who is wholly 
guilty .... Although some statutes specify that 
a divorce may be granted to 'the party not in fault' 
our staltde wisely contains no such provision." 
The court then recites its policy of taking into con-
sideration the practical exigencies of such situations. 
In vie,ving the practical exigencies of the Hendricks 
1narriage, it granted a divorce to the one least at fault 
where no good purpose, either social, moral, ethical, or 
legal, could be served by eompelling these two people, 
clearly ill-suited and maladjusted to each other, to con-
tinue the legal relationship of husband and wife. The 
identical situation exists in the Griffiths case. Should 
the court refuse to grant a divorce to the plaintiff simply 
because the wife doesn't seek a divorce and thereby mere-
ly lessens the burden on the court of weighing the niceties 
of the cruelty of each to decide "\vho was least at fault~ 
Also, Finding 10 recites that plaintiff's past cruelty and 
adultery was condoned by the defendant and never revived 
after the parties resumed CfJhabitation in Virginia in 194 7. 
As stated, her only worthy claim of cruelty on the 
part of respondent toward her during their marriage was 
his alleged adultery, and the evidence of both parties is 
in accord that the appellant forgave her husband, con-
doned his conduct, and they thereafter cohabited and 
lived together as husband and wife in Virginia for 
about three months. There is no evidence in the record 
that the plaintiff ever repeated or revived the condoned 
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conduct, and appellant is therefore left bereft of the 
cruelty with which she now so volubly brands the re-
spondent. So how does the Hendricks case support her 
when there is no adultery left~ 
An extensive annotation of 74 pages con1mencing 
at p. 102 of 32 ALR 2d fully reviews and cites cases re-
stating the well-accepted rule that condonation followed 
by cohabitation without the offender repeating or reviv-
ing the condoned conduct thereafter, will bar the injured 
party frorn raising such previously condoned conduct as 
grounds for divorce. The headnote case, Brown v. 
Brown, Kan., 232 P. 2d 603, was an appeal from a divorce 
granted to the husband, the 'vife contesting the suffi-
ciency of the husband's evidence and the failure of the 
court to recognize her defense of condonation by the 
hushand. The divorce 'vas affirmed, the husband's evi-
dence of cruelty consisting of the wife's expressing dis-
approval of the appellee's choice of jobs, his fa1uily, his 
hobbies and recreation cl~oices, their houses and furni-
ture, and her constant nagging pertaining to the way he 
drove a car, his smoking, drinking and so forth. We cite 
this c:r'uelty, which 'vas deen1ed adequate to support the 
granting of a divorce to the husband, because it so closely 
parallels the cruel acts set forth by respondent as having 
been corn1nitted by his wife in the instant case. In the 
Brown case, the review court rejected the "rife's defense 
of condonation, since she repeated her cruel conduct after 
her husband's condonation thereof. The trial judge in 
the case before this Court found that appellant repeated 
her cruel conduct 'vhen she lived 'vith respondent in 
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·virginia for sorne three n1onths after his condonation 
of her former cruelty and their subsequent cohabitation. 
(Finding No. 9) 
Appellant cites the case of Clark v. Clark, Ne'v ~lex., 
225 P. 2d 147, and states in her brief that this cas.e an-
swers the question presented in the case now before the 
court, ~'Does recrimination afford a valid defense in a 
suit for divorce sought on the grounds of incompati-
bility." However, "\Ve think the Clark case supports the 
plaintiff's position and not the defendant's in that it af- . 
fir1ns the right of the trial judge to use his discretionary 
po,vers in trying and deciding equity cases. The Clark 
case holds nothing more than that the trial judge should 
have adn1itted proffered evidence of the husband's adul-
tery and then weighed it in deciding the rnatter. The 
\vife tendered proof of her husband's a.dt~.ltery in support 
of her recriminatory defense of incoinpatihility to heT· 
husband's suit based on incoinpatihility. The trial judge 
held the adultery offered by the defendant in support 
of her defense was iminaterial and excluded proof of it, 
since the courts had ruled th.a.t incompatahility is not a 
recrhninatory defense to incoinpatibility, and granted a 
divorce to the husb-and pursuant to the latest New ~1exico 
case of Pavletich v. Pavletich, 174 P. 2d 832, which held 
that a divorce should be grarnted u·here the parties were 
irreconcilable, the trial judge having dete-r1nined that the 
husband had adduced sufficient proof of incon1patihility 
on his "\vife's part to show that the parties 'vere irrecon-
ci_lahle. 
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Mrs. Clark appealed the rejection of the offered 
proof on the grounds that although incompatibility is not 
as such a recriminatory defense to incompatibility, yet 
it was the adultery that had induced and caused the in-
compatible acts of the wife and the evidence to that ef-
feet should have been admitted. The Supreme Court 
held that under such a situation, possibly the adultery 
could have been the cause of the wife's incompatibility 
and therefore sent the case back for a new trial wherein 
the trial judge should admit and consider the adultery 
and then decide \vhether the husband was still entitled 
to a divorce notwithstanding the adultery. 
This holding is squarely in support of the Court's 
decision in the Griffiths matter. Here the trial judge 
admitted and weighed the husband's association with an-
other woman and thereafter granted a divorce to plain-
tiff after considering this evidence. The Clark case says 
nothing more than that the court should consider this 
evidence and then render a decision consistent with the 
exercise of the eourt's discretion after \veighing all the 
evidence. The trial court in the instant case did exactly 
\vhat the Clark case said the court had a duty to do, and 
then decided in favor of the plaintiff, which the Clark 
case says the court had a right to do. 
Further, \Ve are in accord with the reasoning ex-
pressed in the Pavletich case, supra, that a divorce 
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should be granted to one party or the other where the 
record sho\vs the irreconcilability of the parties. 
Appellant further con1plains that the Court erred in 
believing that 1nental cruelty once Inade out by the hus-
band 1nandatorily required the granting of a divorce 
regardless of \vhat had occasioned the cruelty or how 
guilty the plaintiff hi1nself 1night have been, so long as 
defendant had not asked for a.ffir1native relief and the 
1narriage seemed hopeless, apparently basing her opin-
ion on a passing obse-rvation of the Court at R. 31 that 
'·the df~fendant is not eontesting the divorce." 
Regardless of "\vhat the court said, \vha.t the court did 
is vvhat is important. I-Iow can the defendant say the ac-
tion was uncontested when the court let in all of the testi-
mony the defendant had, regardless of whether it was 
pleaded or nbt. Although the defendant did not counter-
claim for a divorce, she contested it by saying the plain-
tiff was not entitled to a divorc-e and she introduced all 
the evidence she desired to negate plain tiff's evidence. 
I-Io,vever, the trial court after weighing all of the evi-
dence in the case sa\v fit to grant the plaintiff a. divorce 
and 've think justly and equitably so. 
vVe note in pass1ng that appellant's brief remarks 
in one place of the "guilt" and "n1ost serious Inisconduct" 
of the plaintiff, and in another place, of the plaintiff be-
ing guilty of "such shocking conduct.'' In view that the de-
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fendant believes this to be true and so alleges in her brief 
' ' we are at a loss to find any other conclusion for her 
not wanting to have a divorce in this matter or lettin(}' 
b 
the plaintiff have a divorce, except for her own vin-
dictiveness and selfishness or desire for personal gain 
from allutment p-rotection, and the Court in Finding 12 
so finds her motives to be in resisting this divorce. 
POINT II. 
INSUFFJ,CIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The ap~p:ella.nt claims the evidence is insufficient to 
justify the. decision, since the only cruel acts of defendant 
happened durin&' a 90 day period in 1946 and were justi-
fied beeause of plaintiff's conduct. Appellant attempts. 
to invade the province of the court and deter1nine this 
case on the basis of the evidence as she believes it. There 
is no question in our minds but that the court took into 
consideration the novel and peculiar nature of this par-
ticular marriage and all of the evidence as a whole, in 
reaching its decision. That is the very purpose of the 
trial court, to weigh all the evidence, and determine the 
case in accordance with whom and 'vhat evidence the 
court chooses to believe. The court detern1ined, as set 
forth in its Findings of Fact, that the defendant had 
been guilty of sufficient acts of cruelty toward plaintiff 
to cause hi1n grevious 1nental suffering and undermine 
his health and warrant the awarding of a divorce to 
him.. Certainly the court can believe one as against the 
other, particularly 'vhen defendant's testi1nony IS so 
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anomalous. For instance, after finding plaintiff at Can1p 
Lee with another wo1nan, the defendant condoned pl~ain­
tiff and started living with him. She attempted to im-
press the co-urt that the association was never thereafter 
mentioned and caused no difficulty or concern between 
them-that they lived as t\vo doves in a cote (P. 64). Her 
falling off and losing weight was due to "climatic condi-
tions" (P. 64). If that was the true loving situation be-
t,veen them, ~-hen why did she demand and receive a 
statement from plaintiff that he \vould not use her de-
parture as grounds for desertion, when she left Can1p 
Lee and returned to Salt Lake City. 
'l.,he appellant cites the case of Aldredge v. Aldredge, 
Utah 229 P. 2d 681, which recites that a review court 
has the duty and power to determine the facts for itself. 
IIowever, in this case, if the eourt will please note I-Ie·ad-
note No. 2 and also page 682, Note No. 1 and 2, it states 
as follo,vs : 
"In her appeal, the first contention of the 
defendant is that there is no evidence in the record 
upon which the court could find defendant guilty 
of mental cruelty. As this case is an equity case, 
this court has the duty and the po,ver to detern1ine 
the facts for itself. I:Iowever, as was held in Doe 
v. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 J>. 781, 786, and Schuster 
v. Schuster, 88 Utah 257, 53 P. 2d 428, we will 
not up·set findings of the trial court on issues in 
which the testimony was in conflict, unless the rec-
ord shows that such findings are clearly against 
the vveight of the evjdence. See also Stanley v. 
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Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P. 2d 465; this because 
the trial cou,rt· has a better opportunity to ju.dge 
the credibility of the witnesses and the weight 
of their testimon.y. Especially is this trne in cases 
involving quarrels between spouses." 
The C'ourt will readily see from what is quoted in this 
case and as set out hereinabove that the trial judge is 
always the one who has the opportunity to note the de-
meanor of the witnesses before him and note the manner 
in which they give their testiinony and also to note the 
conflicts of the tes·timony and therefore is always in a 
better position to be a judge of the veracity of the witness 
or witnesses. And our Supreme Court has s'o held in 
many, many cases. Also, if the Court will take a moment 
in which to read the Findings of F·act that the Court 
signed, and we refer particularly to Paragraphs 8, 12, 13, 
and 14, of the Findings of the Court, it \vill there note 
that the C'ourt evidently, because of the conflict in the 
testimony, believed the plaintiff as oagainst the defendant 
and as a result thereof placed n1ore weight on the testi-
mony of the plaintiff than that of the defendant and 
thereafter, a.s a matter of course, granted a divorce to the 
plain tiff herein on the grounds of cruelty. 
The defendant also cite·s the case of Cordne'r v. Cord-
ner, Utah, 61 P. 2d 601, \vherein he states that a trial 
court's finding will he upset "\vhere the record shows such 
findings are clearly against the weight of the evidence 
and, of course, \Ve agree with that statement of the la\v. 
J!owever, in the instant case, the evidence \vas so vastly 
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different and so rnuch stronger and carried so n1uch 1nore 
·weight than it did in the Cordner case that there is no 
con1parison. Also the Cordner case was not particularly 
decided on the evidence and testimony but on the plead-
ings of the Complaint, whether or not it stated a cause 
of acti:on as against a general demurrer, and the Supre1ne 
Court ruled that the Cornplaint did not state a cause of 
action. Just by way of passing and quoting fron1 page 
G03 of the Cordner case, we find as follows : "There is no 
allega.tiion of constant nagging, harassing, or annoying 
conduct, no rebuking of plaintiff publicly or p-rivately 
'vith intent to humiliate plaintiff or to injure his char-
acter or reputation." (indicating such allegations 'vould 
state a cause of action.) The language of the Supre1ne 
Court indicates that a contrary decision w·ould have been 
reached if these allegations had been pleaded. The in-
stant case not only has practically all these allegations, 
hut there is ample evidence in the record to supp,ort 
them. Also again, we must ask the Court to keep in mind 
Findings N o.'s 8, 12, 13, and 14, which are Findings 1na.de 
by the trial court 'vhich support the qut>ted statement 
hereinabove made by the Supre1ne Court. 
In Pinion v. Pinion, Utah, 67 P. 2d 267, 've 'vish to 
call the Court's attention to what is stated in this case 
at Page 268, which is as follows: 
''Even in an equity case, we do not overturn 
the judgment unless it is fairly against the pre-
ponderance of the evidence. ~ehe writer believes 
that every intenchnent should he in favor o£ the 
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· trial. court, for not only does he in a divorce case 
have the parties before hi1n, enabling him to test 
credi·bility by demeanor, but the conduct and 
manner of the parties in the court room sometunes 
gives much aid in solving who really is at fault. 
Moreover, a trial judge may 'live with' a divorce 
proceeding in its preliminary stages and know 
it from angles which the record does not disclose." 
Now, we turn to the case of Anderson v. Anderson, 
Utah 138 P. 2d 254, quoted by the appellant in her brief, 
and we refer the Court particularly to Page 254, wherein 
our Supreme Court says a.s follo,vs: 
.-
t ·~ 
"At the outset, it must be conceded that if 
the matters alleged in the complaint actually took 
place, it would be sufficient grounds of cruelty 
to warrant granting a divorce .. to plaintiff. vVhile 
the evidence is conflicting, the court found the 
allegations to be true. There is sufficient evi-
dence to support such findings of the trial court. 
It m<tltSt be re·membered that the lower court saw 
the witnesses, a;n.d in a case of this kind much 
could be determined from their demeanor and 
the way in which they answered the questions 
p·ut to them in court. There were certain. incon-
si.ste·ncies _in the. testimony of defendant. From 
this and from the trial cou.rt's observation of wit-
nesses' demeanor the tr-ial court d.etermined tha.t 
her testimony was not entitled to the sam.e credi-
bility a.s plaintiff's. 
"As we have only the cold record before us, 
we rannot say that the lower court was in error 
in this conclusion. vVe affirn1 the findings of the 
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lower court on Issues presented by plaintiff's 
Con1plaint." 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we 'vould like to state to the Court our 
position based and keeping in mind the overall picture 
drawn f:rom all of the evidence introduced in this case. 
We think that it simmered down to merely this : r~rwo 
pe·ople who have been 1narried in na1ne only for approxi-
Inately ten years and have lived together not n1ore than 
six 1nonths during this whole ten year p·eriod. ·At inter-
vals when they have gotten together, they have quarreled, 
disagreed, fought, and nagged continuously, and inces-
santly and enjoyed nothing in common, and we see no 
reason or logic 'vhy two people should be forced to live to-
gether under these uncongenial, emotionally upsetting cir-
cumstances. VVhat could be more shocking than to have 
people such as these living among society and constantly 
arguing, nagging, and harassing each other in public, 
a1nong their friends, and in th.eir hon1e and otherwise. 
vV e further think that the Findings Inade by the trial 
court in this case were of a very substantial nature by 
virtue of the evidence introduced in this record and one 
\vill note by reading particularly the Findings of Fact, 
N o.'s 8, 12, 13, and 14 that the court believed those Find-
ings of Fact to be true as against all the evidence that 
might have been and was introduced, \vhether pleaded 
or not, by the defendant in this case. We want to further 
state that \Ve think legally and logically tha.t the trial 
court finding the issues in favor of the plaintiff for a. 
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divorce on grounds of cruelty in this action was un-
questionably p.roper and within its province, and we are 
confident that this Court in reviewing the Findings made 
by the trial court should have no hesitancy in affirrn-
ing the trial court's decision under the overwhelming 
factual circumstances adduced by plaintiff. 
In closing, we cite. Finaing No. 14, which reiterates 
the very language and reasoning under which the Hen-
dricks divorce "\Vas granted by ruling of this Court: "The 
legitimate ends of matrimony in this case appear defi-
nitely to have been lost and destroyed beyond hope of 
redemption .... It ap·p·ears that no good purpose, either 
social, moral, ethical or legal, will be served by requir-
ing these parties to continue a relationship that is a 
mockery of the true concept of matrimony, the parties 
being clearly ill suited and maladjusted toward each 
other and having n_o interests in common to continue 
the legal relationship, of husband and wife." 
Res·pectfully submitted this 26th day of July, 1954. 
MARY CONDAS LEHMER 
JOE P. BOSONE 
Attorneys for Plantiff and 
Respondent 
4:05 Felt Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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